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Abstract—When planning the investment in Microgrids (MGs),
usually static security constraints are included to ensure their
resilience and ability to operate in islanded mode. However, un-
scheduled islanding events may trigger cascading disconnections
of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) inside the MG due to
the transient response, leading to a partial or full loss of load.
In this paper, a min-max-min, hybrid, stochastic-robust investment
planning model is proposed to obtain a resilient MG considering
both High-Impact-Low-Frequency (HILF) and Low-Impact-High-
Frequency (LIHF) uncertainties. The HILF uncertainty pertains to
the unscheduled islanding of the MG after a disastrous event, and
the LIHF uncertainty relates to correlated loads and DER genera-
tion, characterized by a set of scenarios. The MG resilience under
both types of uncertainty is ensured by incorporating static and
transient islanding constraints into the proposed investment model.
The inclusion of transient response constraints leads to a min-max-
min problem with a non-linear dynamic frequency response model
that cannot be solved directly by available optimization tools. Thus,
in this paper, a three-stage solution approach is proposed to find
the optimal investment plan. The performance of the proposed
algorithm is tested on the CIGRE 18-node distribution network.
Index Terms—Investment planning, microgrids, low-inertia, fre-
quency constraints, unscheduled islanding, resilience.
NOMENCLATURE
Functions
Θgm,opr Total operational costs in grid-connected mode [$].
Θim,oprto Total penalty costs of disconnecting loads from MG at
hour t in representative day o in islanded mode [$].
Θ˘im,opr Vector-valued function of total penalty costs of discon-
necting loads from MG in islanded mode [$].
Θinv Total investment costs [$].
Indices
g Index of generators, g ∈ {c, d, i, v}.
n Index of nodes, n′′/n′ being a node before/after node n.
o Index of representative days.
t Index of hours.
ψ Index of iterations.
Parameters
cgo Daily capacity factor of generator g in representative day
o.
D Normalized damping constant of all generators [p.u.].
Dg Normalized damping constant of SGs [p.u.].
Dv Virtual damping constant of VSM-based CIG v [p.u.].
d
pc/qc
nto Constant part of active/reactive load d
p/q
nto [kWh].
eno Flexible energy demand of node n in representative day
o [kWh].
e
b/s
to Buying/selling price of electricity from/to the main grid
at hour t in representative day o [$/kWh].
Fi Fraction of the total power generated by the turbine of
SG i, Fg being the weighted average of all SGs [p.u.].
fcn Penalty cost of shifting demand at node n [$/kWh].
icg Annualized investment cost of generator g [$].
icnn′ Annualized investment/reinforcement cost of a line con-
necting nodes (n, n′) [$].
Kd Power gain factor of droop-based CIG d [p.u.].
Ki Mechanical power gain factor of SG i [p.u.].
M Normalized inertia constant of all SGs and CIGs [s].
Mg Normalized inertia constant for the CoI of SGs [s].
Mv Virtual inertia constant of CIG v with VSM control [s].
mcg Marginal cost of generator g [$/kWh].
pcn Penalty cost of disconnecting demand at node n
[$/kWh].
Rd Droop of CIG d with droop control [%].
Ri Droop of SG i, Rg being the weighted average of all
SGs [%].
r
d/u
g Ramp-down/ramp-up limit of generator g [kW/h].
rn′n Resistance of a line connecting nodes (n, n′) [Ω].
sn′n Capacity of a line connecting nodes (n, n′) [kVA].
Td/v Time constant of CIG d/v with droop/VSM control [ms].
Ti Turbine time constant of SG i [s].
xn′n Reactance of a line connecting nodes (n, n′) [Ω].
z0nn′ Initial status of a line connecting nodes (n, n
′) (i.e., 1/0:
built/not-built).
α Scaling factor.
ζ Damping ratio.
ωn Natural frequency [p.u.].
τo Weighting factor of representative day o.
 Corrective power deviation tolerance [kW].
Sets
ΩC Set of CIGs, ΩCn being the set of generators connected
to node n.
ΩCd/v Set of CIGs with droop/VSM control scheme.
Ωgm,opr Feasible space of operational variables in grid-
connected mode.
Ωim,opr Feasible space of operational variables in islanded mode.
Ωinv Feasible space of investment-related variables.
ΩL Set of lines connecting neighbouring nodes.
ΩMG Feasible space of the MG planning problem.
ΩN Set of nodes, ΩNn being the set of nodes after and
connected to node n.
ΩO Set of representative days.
ΩS Set of SGs, ΩSn being the set of generators connected
to node n.
ΩT Set of hours.
Symbols
•ˆ Deviations of the quantity • in the islanded mode from
its value in the grid-connected mode, •ˆ+/•ˆ− being
upward/downward deviations.
| • | Cardinality of the set •.
•/• Lower/upper bounds of the quantity •.
Variables
d
p/q
nto Active/reactive load of node n at hour t in representative
day o [kWh/kVAr].
d
pf/qf
nto Flexible part of active/reactive load d
p/q
nto [kWh/kVAr].
p/qgto Active/reactive power generation of generator g at hour
h in representative day o [kWh/kVAr].
p/q
b/s
to Active/reactive power flow bought/sold to the main grid
at hour h in representative day o [kWh/kVAr].
pnn′to Active power flow of a line connecting nodes (n, n′) at
hour h in representative day o [kWh].
qnn′to Reactive power flow of a line connecting nodes (n, n′)
at hour h in representative day o [kVAr].
vnto Voltage magnitude of node n at hour h in representative
day o [V ].
ynto Binary variable indicating the connection status of load
of node n at hour t in representative day o (i.e., 1/0:
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2connected/disconnected).
zg Binary variable indicating the investment status of gen-
erator g (i.e., 1/0: built/not-built).
znn′ Binary variable indicating the investment/reinforcement
status of a line connecting nodes (n, n′) (i.e., 1/0:
built/not-built).
Vectors
χ Vector of all investment and operational variables.
χgm,opr Vector of “wait-and-see” operational variables in grid-
connected mode.
χim,opr Vector of “wait-and-see” operational variables in is-
landed mode.
χinv Vector of “here-and-now” investment variables.
η Vector of representative days (i.e., scenarios).
I. INTRODUCTION
RESILIENT electric networks must have the ability to ridethrough extreme contingencies, maintain basic service levels
to critical load demands, and ensure fast recovery to normality.
In other words, a resilient system should be able to modify its
functionality and alter its structure in an agile manner without
collapsing [1]. The main measures to enhance the resilience of
electric networks can be categorized into [2]: (i) “hardening”,
which incorporates all activities aimed at reinforcing electric net-
works and enhancing component designs and constructions with
the intention of preserving functionality and minimizing damage;
(ii) “survivability”, which includes innovative technologies to
diversify energy supply and improve system flexibility; and (iii)
“recovery”, which incorporates all tools aimed at restoring the
system to normal operating conditions. Of particular concern is
the resilience of electricity distribution networks due to their
interdependence with other critical infrastructure, which might
culminate in a sustained negative impact on society. With this
background, Microgrids (MGs) have been widely considered
as a potential pathway for enhancing system resilience and
ensuring both structural reinforcement and operational flexibility
by allowing for the coexistence of Distributed Energy Resources
(DERs) with the traditional bulk grid [3], [4].
MGs are flexible distribution systems able to operate in both
grid-connected and islanded mode [5]. Their islanding capability
is critical in enhancing resilience by ensuring continuity and
mitigating interruptions of energy supply to consumers in the
event of extreme weather conditions or significant faults in the
bulk transmission grid [6], [7]. The successful island creation,
especially following disastrous events, is subject to the secure
transient performance of DERs, thus ensuring the survivability
of the MG. However, unlike traditional bulk grids, MGs are
inherently faced with a lack of rotational inertia and damping
capability affecting their security in the event of significant
power imbalance, and more importantly, islanding from the main
grid [8]. Thus, it is vital to design a resilient and reliable
MG able to withstand both High-Impact-Low-Frequency (HILF)
and Low-Impact-High-Frequency (LIHF) uncertainties, under
static and transient operational constraints. On the one hand,
static islanding constraints ensure the MG’s operational adequacy
in supplying the forecasted electricity demand. On the other
hand, transient islanding constraints ensure the MG’s operational
security by adhering to a dynamic response within the defined
regulatory limits and, consequently, avoiding the operation of
protective devices that would result in DER disconnections.
Different stochastic [9], robust [10]–[12], and distributionally
robust [13] planning tools have been previously presented in
the literature for optimal investment in distribution networks
and MGs aiming at enhancing system resilience to extreme
contingencies. In [9], a stochastic model has been proposed
for optimal investment in distribution networks under different
disastrous events characterized by a set of scenarios. In [10], a
robust resilience-constrained MG planning model is introduced
under the uncertainty of loads and power generation of Re-
newable Energy Sources (RESs), with islanding from the main
grid considered as another source of uncertainty. In [11], a
robust defender-attacker-defender model is presented for optimal
hardening planning in resilient distribution networks, consider-
ing topology reconfiguration and islanding formation. Besides,
in [12], a robust model is proposed for hardening and investment
planning in distribution networks based on a multi-stage and
multi-zone uncertainty modeling of spatial and temporal char-
acteristics of natural disasters. Additionally, a distributionally
robust resilience-constrained investment planning model under
natural disasters is introduced in [13], where a moment-based
ambiguity set characterizes extreme events. Even though the
literature offers several operational planning models for tra-
ditional bulk grids under dynamic security constraints [14]–
[20], to the best of the authors’ knowledge, previous resilience-
constrained investment planning models for MGs [10], [21], and
even active distribution networks [9]–[12], have only considered
static operational constraints rather than dynamic ones.
The problem of ensuring dynamic security in power systems
has been studied in [14], where a transient stability-constrained
Optimal Power Flow (OPF) is employed with a single-machine
infinite-bus model characterizing the transient stability con-
straints in order to facilitate secure frequency response. Simi-
larly, a discretized transient response is embedded in the OPF
problem in [15] to ensure a secure transient frequency response.
In [16], an analytical formulation is presented to limit the Rate-
of-Change-of-Frequency (RoCoF) based on a single-machine
Center-of-Inertia (CoI) frequency model, while [17] uses a sim-
plified model of transient frequency metrics to analyze the post-
fault response. Such simplified frequency response models tend
to describe system dynamics inaccurately and cannot quantify
the support provided by different units. A reduced second-
order model is used in [18] to determine sufficient synthetic
inertia and droop slopes for a collection of traditional and
inverter-interfaced generators that satisfy both steady-state and
dynamic frequency requirements. Moreover, in [19] and [20],
the unit commitment problem is solved under frequency-related
constraints for traditional and low-inertia grids, where frequency-
related constraints are derived based on a low-order non-linear
frequency response model [22].
Nevertheless, all aforementioned studies have certain draw-
backs, as they are based on either simplified dynamic mod-
els [16]–[18], linearized frequency-related constraints [19], or
make ex-ante bound extractions on the relevant variables [20] to
simplify the planning model. Furthermore, the simplifications
therein represent the characteristic properties of transmission
networks rather than active distribution networks and MGs. Ac-
cordingly, it is vital to present a resilience-oriented MG planning
tool, including both static and transient constraints, based on a
detailed dynamic model to ensure satisfactory operation given
the abrupt main grid disconnection in the event of extreme
contingencies.
The paper’s main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• A min-max-min, stochastic-robust, investment planning model,
is introduced to design a resilient MG under both HILF
and LIHF uncertainties. The HILF uncertainty pertains to
the unscheduled islanding of the MG from the main grid
while the LIHF uncertainties relate to correlated load and RES
generation. For the latter, the k-means clustering technique is
used to obtain a sufficient number of scenarios (i.e., repre-
sentative days) characterizing different realizations of LIHF
uncertainties.
• Both static and transient islanding constraints (i.e., the maxi-
mum RoCoF and the frequency nadir as transient-state criteria,
and the frequency deviation as a quasi steady-state criterion)
are considered in the proposed model to ensure resilience
under HILF and LIHF uncertainties. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, there is no similar planning tool in the literature
that includes both static and transient islanding constraints.
• A tractable three-stage solution approach is presented since the
proposed min-max-min, hybrid, stochastic-robust investment
3problem with a non-linear frequency response model cannot
be solved directly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the investment planning model is described in a compact
form together with the main modeling preliminaries. Section III
presents the detailed problem formulation under static and
transient islanding constraints, whereas Section IV discusses
the application of the proposed investment planning model on
the CIGRE 18-node distribution network in order to design
a resilient MG under different operating conditions. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper.
II. MODELING PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The modeling preliminaries in the proposed investment plan-
ning model are:
• Without loss of generality, a single-year planning horizon is
considered rather than a multi-year one to reach a compromise
between accuracy and tractability of the proposed model.
• To capture interday/intraday variation/ramping of uncertain
loads and power generation of RESs, a sufficient number of
representative days (i.e., scenarios) is considered, obtained by
the k-means clustering technique [23].
• A linearized version of the DistFlow model is used for
the power flow formulation to obtain a linear optimization
problem [24], [25]. Additionally, the quadratic line flow ex-
pressions are linearized using a piecewise linear approxi-
mation [26]. Finally, a constant marginal cost is utilized to
eliminate the non-linearity of quadratic cost functions [23].
• It is assumed that an unscheduled islanding event might
happen at each hour of the representative days considered.
A. Compact Formulation under Static Constraints
The proposed min-max-min investment planning model under
static operational constraints in grid-connected and islanded
mode can be presented in compact form as:
min
χ∈ΩMG
Θinv(χinv) + Θgm,opr(χinv, χgm,opr)
+ ||Θ˘im,opr(χinv, χgm,opr, χim,opr)||∞,
(1)
where ΩMG = {χ = [χinv, χgm,opr, χim,opr] |χinv ∈
Ωinv ; χgm,opr ∈ Ωgm,opr ; χim,opr ∈ Ωim,opr}, Θ˘im,opr =
[min Θim,opr11 , ...,min Θ
im,opr
T O ], T = |ΩT|, and O = |ΩO|.
Also, ||Θ˘im,opr||∞ = max(min∀t,∀oΘ
im,opr
to ). Hence, the objective
function (1) minimizes the total investment costs (Θinv), the
“expected” total operation costs in grid-connected mode for all
hours of all representative days (Θgm,opr), and the “worst-case”
total penalty costs of disconnecting loads from MG in islanded
mode for all hours in all representative days (Θim,opr).
The min-max-min objective function (1) can be rewritten as a
single minimization problem by using the auxiliary variable γ:
min
χ∈ΩMG
Θinv(χinv) + Θgm,opr(χinv, χgm,opr) + γ (2a)
s.t. γ ≥ Θim,oprto (χinv, χgm,opr, χim,opr), ∀t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO,
(2b)
The optimization problem (2) is a Mixed-Integer Linear Pro-
gramming (MILP) problem, and as such can be solved by
available software packages to obtain optimal investment and
operation decisions in grid-connected and islanded mode. How-
ever, the operation decisions may violate transient islanding
constraints. To remedy such limitation and ensure MG resilience
before and after an islanding event, a three-stage methodology
is employed, incorporating a non-linear model for evaluation of
the transient frequency response of a MG after islanding. In the
sequel, the MG frequency dynamics, the metrics to evaluate the
transient frequency response of a MG in islanded mode, as well
as the proposed three-stage solution approach are presented.
B. Microgrid Frequency Dynamics
The employed dynamic model is based on the uniform
representation of frequency transients in a low-inertia system
previously introduced in [20], [27], comprising both tradi-
tional Synchronous Generators (SGs, indexed by i ∈ ΩS) and
Converter-Interfaced Generators (CIGs, indexed by c ∈ ΩC). The
generator dynamics are described by the CoI swing equation with
aggregate inertia Mg and damping Dg . The low-order model
proposed in [28] is used for modeling the governor droop and
turbine dynamics. The impact of grid-supporting CIGs providing
frequency support via droop (d ∈ ΩCd ⊆ ΩC) and virtual
synchronous machine (VSM) (v ∈ ΩCv ⊆ ΩC) control is also
included, as these are the two most common control approaches
in the literature [29], [30]. Hence, the transfer function G(s)
between the active power change ∆Pe(s), with positive values
corresponding to a net load decrease, and the CoI frequency
deviation ∆f(s) can be derived as:
G(s) =
∆f(s)
∆Pe(s)
=
(
(sMg +Dg) +
∑
i∈ΩS
Ki(1 + sFiTi)
Ri(1 + sTi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
traditional SGs
+
∑
d∈ΩCd
Kd
Rd(1 + sTd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
droop-based CIGs
+
∑
v∈ΩCv
sMv +Dv
1 + sTv︸ ︷︷ ︸
VSM-based CIGs
)−1
. (3)
Assuming that the time constants (Ti ≈ T ) of all SGs are several
orders of magnitude higher than the ones of converters [31], one
can approximate T  Td,v ≈ 0, which transforms (3) into:
G(s) =
1
MT
1 + sT
s2 + 2ζωns+ ω2n
, (4)
where ωn =
√
D+Rg
MT and ζ =
M+T (D+Fg)
2
√
MT (D+Rg)
. More details on
the proposed second-order frequency model in (4) and mathe-
matical formulation can be found in [27].
C. Dynamic Metrics for Microgrid Islanding
Following a disturbance, the dynamic frequency response is
characterized by the instantaneous RoCoF (f˙max) and frequency
nadir (∆fmax), whereas the steady-state response is governed
by the constant frequency deviation from a pre-disturbance
equilibrium (∆fss). By assuming a stepwise disturbance in the
active power ∆Pe(s) = −∆P/s, where ∆P is the net power
change, the time-domain expression for frequency metrics of
interest can be derived as follows:
f˙max = f˙(t
+
0 ) = −
∆P
M
, (5a)
∆fmax = − ∆P
D +Rg
(
1 +
√
T (Rg − Fg)
M
e−ζωntm
)
, (5b)
∆fss = − ∆P
D +Rg
, (5c)
with the introduction of new variable ωd = ωn
√
1− ζ2 and
tm = (1/ωd) tan
−1 (ωd/(ωnζ − T−1)) denoting the time instance
of frequency nadir.
It can be clearly seen that the aggregate system parameters
such as M , D, Rg and Fg have a direct impact on frequency per-
formance. In particular, RoCoF and steady-state deviation are ex-
plicitly affected by M and (D,Rg), respectively, while frequency
nadir has a non-linear dependency on all four system factors.
With the increasing penetration of CIGs and subsequent decom-
missioning of conventional SGs, these parameters are drastically
reduced and can compromise the overall frequency performance.
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Fig. 1. Proposed three-stage MG planning algorithm.
To prevent the accidental activation of load-shedding, under/over
frequency and RoCoF protection relays, the proposed three-stage
solution algorithm, described in the following, imposes limits
on the aforementioned frequency metrics to account for low
levels of inertia and damping and their impact on the frequency
response after a MG islanding.
D. Three-Stage Solution Algorithm
The proposed three-stage approach proposed for solving the
problem (2) with the inclusion of static and transient security
constraints is illustrated in Fig. 1 and can be summarized as
follows:
1) Solving the Static Investment Planning Problem: At each
iteration ψ, the investment planning model (2) is solved under
static security constraints in both grid-connected and islanded
mode. A detailed formulation is provided in Section III-A.
2) Evaluating Transient Frequency Security: The unsched-
uled loss of power exchange with the main grid may result
in large frequency transients within the MG. Following the
discussion from Section II-C, the transient frequency response is
characterized by the magnitude of the abrupt active power loss
(∆P ) and the aggregate control parameters of all MG generators
(M , D, Rg , and Fg). Therefore, the magnitude of the potential
disturbance at each hour of every representative day during
the planning horizon is set equal to the power exchange with
the main grid scheduled at the time of the disconnection (i.e.,
∆P = p
b/s
toψ). At the same time, the control parameters depend
on the built/not-built status of generators in the MG at each
iteration (zgψ). Consequently, at each iteration ψ, this stage of
the algorithm uses the variables pb/stoψ and zgψ obtained from
the first stage to evaluate the solution feasibility under transient
security constraints in (5), described in detail in Section III-B.
The solution of the second stage provides the minimum
amount of corrective deviation (∆pb/stoψ) from the scheduled
power exchange with the main grid (pb/stoψ) to meet the transient
security criteria. If this value is zero or less than a small
tolerance, the optimal investment and operational solution ob-
tained from the first-stage problem ensures frequency security in
islanded mode, and the algorithm is terminated. Otherwise, the
algorithm proceeds to the third stage.
3) Tightening Power Exchange with the Main Grid: The third
stage of the algorithm employs the non-zero solution obtained
from the previous stage to tighten the permissible limits imposed
on the power exchange with the main grid at each hour of every
representative day throughout the planning horizon. Once the
respective bounds have been altered, the algorithm proceeds to
the next iteration (ψ + 1). The modified limits may lead either
to a change in the power exchange with the main grid (through
operational decisions), a change in the investment decisions, or
both.
III. EXTENDED FORMULATION UNDER STATIC AND
TRANSIENT CONSTRAINTS
In this section, the extended formulation of the proposed
planning tool under static and transient constraints is presented.
The iteration index ψ is omitted for better legibility and brevity.
A. Extended Formulation under Static Constraints
The optimization problem in the first stage corresponds to
the compact formulation (2), including investment limitations
and static operational constraints in grid-connected and islanded
mode. The extended terms in the objective function and the
constraints are outlined in the following.
1) Investment: The term Θinv(χinv) in the objective function
of the proposed planning problem is given by:
Θinv =
∑
g∈{ΩS,ΩC}
(icg · zg) +
∑
(n,n′)∈ΩL
(icnn′ · znn′) , (6)
and includes the total investment/reinforcement costs of gener-
ators/lines throughout the planning horizon. The optimization
variables χinv = {zg, znn′},∀g ∈
{
ΩS,ΩC
} ∧ ∀(n, n′) ∈ ΩL
are here-and-now decisions.
2) Grid-Connected Operation: The function Θgm,opr captur-
ing the operational cost in grid-connected mode is given by:
Θgm,opr =
∑
o∈ΩO
∑
t∈ΩT
(
τo ·
(
ebto · pbto − esto · psto
))
+
∑
o∈ΩO
∑
t∈ΩT
∑
g∈{ΩS,ΩC}
(τo ·mcg · pgto)
+
∑
o∈ΩO
∑
t∈ΩT
∑
n∈ΩN
(
τo · fcn · dpfnto
) (7a)
The constraints that need to be taken into account to reflect
operational limitations in grid-connected mode are:
pn′′nto + p
b
to|n=1 − psto|n=1 +
∑
g∈{ΩSn ,ΩCn}
pgto
=
∑
n′∈ΩNn
pnn′to + d
p
nto, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO,
(7b)
qn′′nto + q
b
to|n=1 − qsto|n=1 +
∑
g∈{ΩSn ,ΩCn}
qgto
=
∑
n′∈ΩNn
qnn′to + d
q
nto, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO,
(7c)
vn′′to − vnto = (rn′′n · pn′′nto + xn′′n · qn′′nto) ,
∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (7d)
0 ≤ pbto ≤ pbto, 0 ≤ psto ≤ psto, ∀t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (7e)
0 ≤ qbto ≤ qbto, 0 ≤ qsto ≤ qsto, ∀t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (7f)
dpnto = d
pc
nto + d
pf
nto, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (7g)
dqnto = d
qc
nto + d
qf
nto, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (7h)
dpfnto ≤ dpfnto ≤ d
pf
nto, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (7i)
dqfnto ≤ dqfnto ≤ d
qf
nto, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (7j)∑
t∈ΩT
dpnto = eno, ∀n ∈ ΩN, o ∈ ΩO, (7k)
0 ≤ pgto ≤ pgto · zg, ∀g ∈ {ΩC,ΩS}, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (7l)
q
gto
· zg ≤ qgto ≤ qgto · zg, ∀g ∈ {ΩC,ΩS}, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO,
(7m)
− rdg ≤ pgto − pg(t−1)o ≤ rug ,∀g ∈ ΩS, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (7n)∑
t∈ΩT
pgto ≤ cgo · pgto, ∀g ∈ ΩS, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (7o)
5p2nn′to + q
2
nn′to ≤ s2nn′ ·
(
z0nn′ + znn′
)
,
∀(n, n′) ∈ ΩL, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (7p)
v ≤ vnto ≤ v, vto|n=1 = 1, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (7q)
Here, the vector of wait-and-see decision variables is given by
χgm,opr = {dp/qnto , dpf/qfnto , pgto, pnn′to, pb/sto , qgto, qnn′to, vnto}.
The objective function (7a) minimizes the total operation
costs, including the total costs of power exchange with the
main grid, the total operation costs of generators, and the total
penalty costs of shifting loads away from the periods preferred
by consumers. Constraints (7b)-(7d) describe the power flows
based on the linearized version of the DistFlow model [24], [25],
and (7e)-(7f) ensure the non-negativity and impose the upper
limits on the power exchange with the main grid. Furthermore,
(7g)-(7j) reflect the power balance of constant and flexible
loads as well as the limitations of flexible loads at each node
and at every hour of each representative day, whereas (7k)
ensures that the daily energy consumption of flexible loads
is maintained for each representative day. Constraints (7l)-(7n)
denote capacity and ramp-rate limits of generators at each hour
of every representative day. Moreover, the reactive power limits
of CIGs are based on the maximum generated active power, i.e.,
qgto = tanφ ·pgto, where cosφ is the maximum power factor of
a unit defined by the grid code. Constraint (7o) defines the daily
capacity factor of SGs in each representative day of the planning
horizon [32], and (7p) imposes the thermal loading limits of
each line. The latter quadratic constraint is linearized by means
of a convex polygon, defined by inner approximations of the
thermal loading circle [26]. Finally, (7q) limits the nodal voltage
magnitudes throughout the planning horizon.
3) Islanded Operation: It is assumed that at every hour of
each representative day, the MG should be able to withstand an
unscheduled islanding event. The operation planning problem
of a MG in islanded mode is aimed at ensuring survivability
and self-sufficiency, where priority is given to critical loads. It
is worthwhile to note that, in this paper, the self-sufficiency
is ensured for one period (i.e., one hour) after disconnection
from the main grid. However, the islanded operation period
can be straightforwardly extended to multiple periods based on
the required resilience. Hereafter, the superscript “im” denotes
operational variables in islanded mode. The function Θim,oprto
capturing the operational cost in islanded mode is given by:
Θim,oprto =
∑
n∈ΩN
(
pcn ·
(
(1− ynto) · dpcnto + dˆp
−
f
nto
))
(8a)
The constraints that need to be taken into account to reflect
operational limitations in islanded mode are:
pim
n′′nto +
∑
g∈{ΩSn ,ΩCn}
pimgto =
∑
n′∈ΩNn
pimnn′to+(
ynto · dpcnto + dim,pfnto
)
, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO,
(8b)
qim
n′′nto +
∑
g∈{ΩSn ,ΩCn}
qimgto =
∑
n′∈ΩNn
qimnn′to+(
ynto · dqcnto + dim,qfnto
)
, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO,
(8c)
vimn′′to − vimnto =
(
rn′′n · pimn′′nto + xn′′n · qimn′′nto
)
,
∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (8d)
dim,pfnto = d
pf
nto + dˆ
p+f
nto − dˆp
−
f
nto, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (8e)
0 ≤ dˆp
+
f
nto, dˆ
p−f
nto ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (8f)
dim,qfnto = d
qf
nto + dˆ
qf
nto, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (8g)
dpfnto ≤ dim,pfnto ≤ d
pf
nto, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (8h)
dqfnto ≤ dim,qfnto ≤ d
qf
nto, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (8i)
dim,pnto ≤ eno −
t−1∑
t′=1
dim,pnt′o , ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (8j)
0 ≤ pimgto ≤ pgto · zg, ∀g ∈ {ΩC,ΩS}, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (8k)
q
gto
· zg ≤ qimgto ≤ qgto · zg, ∀g ∈ {ΩC,ΩS}, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO,
(8l)
− rdg ≤ pimgto − pgto ≤ rug , ∀g ∈ ΩS, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (8m)
pimgto ≤ cgo · pgto −
t−1∑
t′=1
pimgto, ∀g ∈ ΩS, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (8n)
pimnn′to
2
+ qimnn′to
2 ≤ s2nn′to ·
(
z0nn′ + znn′
)
,
∀(n, n′) ∈ ΩL, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO,
(8o)
v ≤ vimnto ≤ v, vimto|n=1 = 1, ∀n ∈ ΩN, t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (8p)
where, similarly to the previous operation planning problem
in grid-connected mode, all operation variables χim,oprto =
{dˆpf/qfnto , dim,pf/im,qfnto , pˆgto, pimgto, pimnn′to, qˆgto, qimgto, qimnn′to, vimnto}
are wait-and-see decisions.
The objective function (8a) minimizes the total unserved load
and ensures an adequate supply of at least the critical MG
loads. It should be noted that pcn describes the priority level
of the load at a specific node, with higher values suggesting
more critical loads, and the amount of unserved flexible load is
denoted by dˆpfnto. Constraints (8b)-(8d) enforce the post-islanding
power flow balance, whereas the deviations between the amount
of flexible load served in grid-connected and islanded mode are
given by (8e)-(8g) and used to determine the fraction of served
and unserved flexible loads in islanded mode. Moreover, (8h)-(8i)
enforce the limitations of flexible loads in islanded mode, and
(8j) restricts the supply of flexible loads in terms of respective
demand already served before the current time instance affected
by a disconnection from the main grid. Constraints (8k)-(8l)
denote capacity limits of generators, (8m)-(8n) indicate that re-
scheduling actions of SGs in islanded mode are subject to their
ramp rate and daily capacity factor limitations as well as their
scheduling actions before the current time step. Furthermore,
similar to the formulation in grid-connected mode, (8o) defines
the thermal loading limit of each line and (8p) limit the nodal
voltage magnitudes. Note that in the grid-connected mode the
voltage at the Point-of-Common Coupling (PCC) is maintained
by the stiff grid, while in the islanded mode it is controlled by
the DERs.
The final optimization problem is a MILP problem in the first
stage of the algorithm, and its solution is subsequently used in
the feasibility check in the second stage.
B. Transient Security Feasibility Checking Problem
The feasibility of the planning solution under transient security
constraints is necessary to guarantee the secure islanding of
a MG. According to the metrics described in (5) and the
discussions in Section II-D, the transient frequency response in
the event of islanding depends on the amount of power exchange
with the main grid at the time of the event (i.e., ∆P = pb/stoψ) and
the control parameters of the online generators in the MG (i.e.,
M(zgψ), D(zgψ), Fg(zgψ) and Rg(zgψ)). Note however that,
with respect to decision variables, (5a) and (5c) are linear while
(5b) is highly non-linear. Given the optimal values of decision
variables obtained from the first stage (pb/stoψ and zgψ), the non-
linear term in (5b) can be defined as a constant at each iteration.
Consequently, at each iteration ψ, the feasibility check can be
formulated as a linear programming problem of the form
Θdynt = min
∆p
b/s
toψ
∣∣∣∆pb/stoψ∣∣∣ (9a)
The constraints that need to be taken into account to ensure
6transient security feasibility are:∣∣∣∣∣p
b/s
toψ + ∆p
b/s
toψ
M
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ f˙lim, (9b)∣∣∣∣∣p
b/s
toψ + ∆p
b/s
toψ
D +Rg
·
(
1 +
√
T (Rg − Fg)
M
e−ζωntm
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∆flim,
(9c)∣∣∣∣∣p
b/s
toψ + ∆p
b/s
toψ
D +Rg
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∆fss,lim. (9d)
The feasibility checking problem (9) is solved independently
for each hour t of every representative day o. Constraints (9b)-
(9d) enforce permissible frequency response limits pertaining
to RoCoF, frequency nadir, and quasi-steady-state frequency
deviation, respectively, whereas slack variables ∆pb/stoψ are used
to identify the violations of transient security limits at a specific
hour and iteration. Accordingly, (9a) provides the minimum
change needed in the scheduled power exchange with the main
grid from the first stage to ensure frequency security. After
solving (9) for each considered time step at each iteration ψ,
the value of ∆pb/stoψ is used to modify and tighten the power
exchange limits with the main grid at the next iteration (ψ+ 1),
as follows:
p bto(ψ+1) = p
b
toψ − α∆pbtoψ, ∀t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO, (10a)
p sto(ψ+1) = p
s
toψ − α∆pstoψ, ∀t ∈ ΩT, o ∈ ΩO. (10b)
The scaling factor α is used to apply a less conservative bound
modification to account for intertemporal power shifting and
investment candidates with frequency support. In this work, a
value of α ∈ [0.5, 0.7] was adopted.
IV. CASE STUDY
A. System Description
A modified CIGRE residential low-voltage network [33],
illustrated in Fig. 2, is used to analyze the performance of the
proposed planning tool. It is assumed that one SG is already
preset at PCC (SG1) and the investment candidates comprise one
SG (SG2) and three PV CIGs (i.e., PV1 and PV2 interfaced
via grid-supporting converters, and PV3 operating in grid-
feeding mode with fixed power output). The fundamental control
parameters obtained from [20] and investment costs (derived
from [10]) of all generators are provided in Table I, while system
operation costs are given in Table II. Moreover, 50 % of nominal
load connected at node 1 is shiftable, whereas high priority
critical loads are connected at nodes 15 and 16. The patterns
of loads and PV generation in Texas during 2016 [34] are used
to obtain representative days through k-means clustering. Note
that all representative days for loads and PV generations as well
as line parameters are provided in the Appendix. The transient
security constraints are enforced through thresholds imposed on
RoCoF (f˙lim = 2 Hz/s), frequency nadir (∆flim = 0.8 Hz), and
quasi-steady-state frequency deviation (∆fss,lim = 0.2 Hz). The
implementation was done in MATLAB, with the optimization
model formulated in YALMIP [35] and solved by GUROBI [36].
To analyze the performance of the proposed planning tool,
three cases are considered: (1) MG planning without any is-
landing constraints; (2) MG planning with only static islanding
constraints; and (3) MG planning with static and transient
frequency islanding constraints.
B. Cost Analysis
In this analysis, the costs of the three aforementioned case
studies are compared under the consideration of four representa-
tive days. Let us first study Case 1, with the respective costs un-
der different capacity limits of the main feeder listed in Table III.
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Fig. 2. Modified CIGRE European low voltage network.
TABLE I
GENERATOR CONTROL PARAMETERS AND INVESTMENT COSTS
SG1 SG2 PV1 PV2 PV3
Annualized investment cost ($) - 40 000 70 000 65 000 60 000
Capacity (kW) 280 350 350 350 350
Node 1 15 17 11 18
M (s) 14 14 14 - -
D (p.u.) 25 25 30 - -
K (p.u.) 1 1 1 1 -
R (p.u.) 0.03 0.03 - 0.05 -
F (p.u.) 0.35 0.35 - - -
Existing generator
Candidate generators
TABLE II
SYSTEM OPERATION COSTS
Import
($/kWh)
Export
($/kWh)
SG
($/kWh)
PV
($/kWh)
Demand
shift
penalty
($/kWh)
Demand
disconnection
penalty
($/kWh)
30 15 60 0 100 (150− 200)∗
*Based on the level of demand criticality, only in islanded mode
Understandably, the MG mainly relies on more affordable power
provided by the main grid instead of dispatching SG1 installed
at PCC. Under the unlimited import capacity from the main grid,
investments in local generation are not economical due to the low
cost of imported power. However, with the introduction of grid
capacity limits (e.g., in instances of net load growth and faults
experienced in the network), the operational costs increase as a
result of the MG relying on the more expensive SG1 at PCC.
Further reduction of grid capacity finally leads to the installment
of PV3, as it yields higher investment but lower operational
costs compared to SG2 and thus significantly reduces the overall
operational costs.
The variation between investment and operational costs for
Cases 2 and 3 is provided in Table IV, where the optimal
solution at iteration ψ = 1 corresponds to the optimal costs of
Case 2. The MG requires higher reliability in Case 2 compared to
Case 1 in order to minimize the loss of load under static security
constraints, whereas in Case 3 the survivability and resilience of
the MG are also considered by including the transient security
constraints. To ensure the MG resilience, higher investment and
operational costs are enforced in both of these case studies
compared to Case 1 due to inclusion of static and transient
islanding constraints. Indeed, a 400 % cost increase for Case 2
is observed, with a further 10 % increase for Case 3. In both
of these cases, the installation of renewable DERs reduces the
total costs despite the significantly higher underlying investment
costs. More precisely, renewable DERs contribute to increased
line flows and power export to the main grid, thus necessitating
a greater network capacity indicated by the upgrade of the
lines between nodes (1-2) and (2-3). However, in turn, the MG
adequacy improves with installing renewable DERs, reflected in
TABLE III
COST COMPARISON WITH VARIATION IN MAIN GRID CAPACITY FOR CASE 1:
MG PLANNING WITHOUT ISLANDING CONSTRAINTS
Main grid
capacity (kW)
Investment costs
& decisions ($)
Operational
costs ($)
Total
costs ($)
Installed
capacity (kW)
Unlimited 0 56 394 56 394 280
250 0 77 795 77 795 280
150 60 000 (PV3) 47 473 107 473 630
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PLANNING COSTS FOR CASE 2 (FINAL COST IN BLUE) AND CASE 3 (FINAL COST IN GREEN) AND AGGREGATED CORRECTIVE POWER DEVIATIONS
INCLUDING FOUR REPRESENTATIVE DAYS.
ψ
Investment costs
& decisions ($)
Operational
costs ($)
Demand
shift
penalty ($)
Demand
disconnection
penalty ($)
Total
costs ($)
Import power
deviation
(kW)
Export power
deviation
(kW)
1 128 000 (PV2, PV3 + Lines 1-2, 2-3, 3-11) 96 956 3 613 5 548 224 956 2 902 1 431
2 127 000 (PV2, PV3 + Lines 1-2, 2-3) 113 872 8 543 5 337 240 872 871 429
3 127 000 (PV2, PV3 + Lines 1-2, 2-3) 118 924 8 796 5 081 245 924 261 129
4 127 000 (PV2, PV3 + Lines 1-2, 2-3) 120 423 8 572 5 334 247 423 78 39
5 127 000 (PV2, PV3 + Lines 1-2, 2-3) 120 890 8 805 5 081 247 890 23 12
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Fig. 3. System performance in terms of the transient frequency metrics for
different iterations of the proposed algorithm including four representative days.
the reduction of lost load and ensuring that critical loads are
supplied even during emergency islanding situations.
Focusing on Case 3, it is noticeable that operational costs
increase at each iteration due to the use of expensive SGs and
flexible loads to mitigate the feasibility violation. Nevertheless,
at instances where operational flexibility alone cannot guarantee
security, more units are installed. Finally, it can be seen that
tightening of the power exchange limits (and thus the power
export) with the main grid alleviates some of the necessary
network investments (e.g., line (3-11) for iterations 1 and 2).
C. Transient Security Analysis
In Case 3, the MG survivability is ensured by meeting the
prescribed transient security criteria. In the second stage of
the algorithm (see Fig. 1), the slack variable ∆pb/sto is used
to indicate the amount of adjustment needed in the scheduled
power exchange with the main grid to satisfy the transient
frequency requirements. Fig. 3 showcases the metrics describing
the dynamic performance of the MG’s CoI after islanding at
each hour. The first iteration corresponds to the system response
without transient security requirements (Case 2).
A significant improvement is recorded in the maximum Ro-
CoF values, even within a single iteration (e.g., reduction from
8 Hz/s to 3.5 Hz/s after the first iteration). Furthermore, each
successive iteration reduces the power exchange with the main
grid during the hours when security limits are violated until all
limits are satisfied. The amount of aggregated corrective power
deviations (
∑
o∈ΩO
∑
t∈ΩT ∆p
b/s
to ) in Table IV is monotonically
decreased with each iteration until the transient security con-
straints are fulfilled. However, these improvements in terms of
security and resilience are achieved at the expense of higher
operational costs by dispatching costly SG and flexible loads.
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Fig. 4. Total costs for different representative days in Cases 2 and 3.
It is clear from Fig. 3 that the RoCoF threshold is the most
limiting factor for secure transient operation. This is expected,
since PV-based CIGs yield a more economic solution but do
not provide the same level of inertia as SGs, thus degrading
the transient performance. In particular, SG1 and PV1 provide
both inertia and damping, PV2 improves damping through droop
control, and PV3 offers no frequency support. Since the inertia
and damping contribution of SG1 and PV2 do not lead to
sufficient transient performance, the reduction in the power
exchange with the main grid is needed to ensure a satisfactory
response. This is achieved through power provision from PV2
and PV3 as well as higher activation of flexible loads.
D. Sensitivity Analysis
1) Representative Days: The stochasticity of both load and
generation profiles affects the planning accuracy, usually re-
sulting in under- or overestimation. As previously described
in Section IV-A, the load and generation profiles are obtained
by utilizing the k-means clustering for different representative
days. Understandably, the number of considered representative
days has a direct impact on the solution of the algorithm. This
can be observed in Fig. 4, where the total investment and
operational costs for Cases 2 and 3 increase with the number of
representative days. In particular, employing more representative
days provides a better representation of system operation, thus
allowing for more accurate estimates of different costs. On the
other hand, it also imposes a higher computational burden. In
particular, the results in Fig. 4 indicate that the overall costs
plateau for excessive number of representative days, suggesting
that the case studies considering up to 16 representative provide
a good trade-off between the accuracy of cost estimates and the
needed computational effort.
2) Operational Flexibility: While flexible loads provide more
degrees of freedom for operational planning, they are costly. In
spite of their high operational costs, in this study they provide
a more affordable option compared to investments in additional
generators for improving system flexibility by reducing the peak
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Fig. 5. Sensitivity of investment and operational costs to the presence of flexible
loads for different representative days in Case 3.
power exchange with the main grid. Indeed, Table IV shows
a successive increase in the use of flexible loads for improving
the transient frequency response. This is justified by the fact that
flexible loads provide a peak shaving service vital for ensuring
survivability during transients.
To this end, Case 3 was studied with and without flexible
loads to thoroughly analyze their impact. In the case of 1 and 16
representative days, the operational costs experience a marginal
decrease under the use of flexible loads, whereas the investment
costs remain intact, as depicted in Fig. 5. In contrast, for other
representative periods the use of flexible loads leads to lower
investment costs, as they alleviate the problems pertaining to
adequate power supply. Moreover, in all four cases the total
costs increase without the use of flexible loads, thus making their
adoption vital for system flexibility and economic operation. The
latter aspect is primarily related to the presence of renewable PV
units, which allow for the loads to be shifted to periods of higher
solar generation. Note that the difference is more prominent in
cases with 4 and 8 representative days since the use of flexible
loads allows to differ investment decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
MGs are expected to play a significant role in increasing the
resilience of electric power systems. Their ability to operate in
both grid-connected and islanded mode is paramount to their
capacity to enhance system reliability. In this paper, the MG
investment planning problem under both static and transient
islanding constraints is investigated. By explicitly embedding the
islanding constraints in the planning problem, the survivability of
the system can be guaranteed and the resilience can be assessed
as a function of the load supplied in islanded conditions. How-
ever, after the islanding event, the transient behavior of the MG is
dictated both by the non-linear dynamics and the investment and
operation decisions, which poses many challenges concerning
the problem formulation. We tackle this problem by proposing
an iterative three-stage algorithm that resolves the underlying
tractability issues and computational challenges, as well as shows
excellent performance on the examined case studies.
Nevertheless, several additional aspects still need to be inves-
tigated in ongoing and future work. For instance, the impact of
information exchange between different layers of the algorithm
on the solution optimality and rate of convergence need to be
assessed. Furthermore, a trade-off between the accuracy of the
transient response model of the MG and the model complexity
should be considered. It is clear though that the need to consider
system dynamics within the MG investment and operational
decisions is crucial for ensuring system resilience.
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9APPENDIX A
Generator Dynamics
Turbine & Governor Control
Converter Control (Droop & VSM)
1
sMg +Dg
Inertia & Damping
K1(1 + sF1T1)
R1(1 + sT1)
1st Generator
Ks(1 + sFiTi)
Ri(1 + sTi)
Mth Generator
...
Kd1
Rd1(1 + sTd1)
1st Converter
sMvc +Dvc
1 + sTvc
Nth Converter
...
∆f∆Pe
−
Fig. 6. Uniform system frequency dynamics model.
APPENDIX B
TABLE V
LOAD PARAMETERS (F: FLEXIBLE, C: CONSTANT)
Node 1 11 15 16 17 18
Type F C C C C C
Nominal Load [kVA] 200 15 52 210 35 47
Power factor 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.85 0.95 0.95
High priority load
Low priority load
TABLE VI
LINE PARAMETERS
Line From Node To Node Length [m] R [p.u. X [p.u.
1 1 2 35 0.010045 0.005845
2 2 3 35 0.010045 0.005845
3 3 4 35 0.010045 0.005845
4 4 5 35 0.010045 0.005845
5 5 6 35 0.010045 0.005845
6 6 7 35 0.010045 0.005845
7 7 8 35 0.010045 0.005845
8 8 9 35 0.010045 0.005845
9 9 10 35 0.010045 0.005845
10 3 11 30 0.03456 0.01374
11 4 12 35 0.04032 0.01603
12 12 13 35 0.04032 0.01603
13 13 14 35 0.04032 0.01603
14 14 15 30 0.03456 0.01374
15 6 16 90 0.1036 0.04122
16 9 17 30 0.03456 0.01374
17 10 18 30 0.03456 0.01374
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Fig. 7. Demand and solar power generation patterns including four representative
days.
